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Abstract 
This theory testing study investigates the decision-making of the member states in 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, using a game theoretical approach. 
Game theory has its origins in political philosophy and can thus be valuable when 
analysing the behaviour of states in international regimes. Through using the 
specific game theory model Stag Hunt, this study aims to examine if such a model 
can be used to explain the behaviour of states in dispute settlement situations, if 
there is a difference in strategies between the member states depending on their 
economic status and if there is a difference in strategies between member states 
before and after the Great Recession of 2008-2009.  
 To answer this, a quantitative analysis of the disputes is first made, to 
which a game theoretic model later is applied. When analysing the implications of 
the model on the dispute settlement, it is concluded that using the Stag Hunt 
game, many segments of the strategies of the member states can be explained 
using the model. However, there is a need for further development of the model to 
give a more complete and fair image of the states’ strategies in dispute settlement 
situations. The result from the study also shows that there is a difference in 
behaviour depending on the economic status of the countries. However, there is 
no shown change in behaviour by the states after the financial crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
In political and economic theories there has been considerable progress in trying 
to explain why sovereign states choose to cooperate in areas such as trade, war 
and in creating economic and social development. The threat of reprisal by an 
aggrieved actor still maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents 
opportunism (Hoffman & Graham, 2009). However, most of the trade 
agreements nowadays contain provisions of dispute settlement, where the most 
well-known is Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) in the World Trade 
Organizations (WTO).  The DSM is often referred to as the centrepiece of the 
multilateral trading system and an important tool for limiting trade barriers 
between member states (Keck & Schropp, 2007). 
During previous international economic crises, domestic pressure on 
governments for protectionism increased in order to maintain national economic 
growth. These measures often led to high trade barriers and import antagonism 
between countries, making the global economic market worse off than before 
(Tadelis, 2013). At the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2008, also known as 
the financial crisis, many therefore feared a new era of protectionism with high 
trade barriers and a dismantled WTO and dispute settlement.  
Because of the mutual advantages of free trade, states would be better off if 
the barriers were eliminated (Axelrod, 1984; Milner, 2004; OECD, 2014; WTO 
E, 2014; IMF, 1996). But if either state were to unilaterally eliminate its barriers, 
it would find itself facing terms of trade that would hurt its own economy. In 
fact, whatever one state does, the other state is better off retaining its own trade 
barriers. Therefore, the problem is that each state has an incentive to retain its 
trade barriers and increase protectionism, leading to a non-functioning WTO and 
a worse outcome than would have been possible had both states cooperated 
(Love & Lattimore, 2009; Hoekman, 2012; Nash & Mitchell, 2005).  
 An appropriate theory in explaining this problem within international 
cooperation would be through using the game theory Stag Hunt. In Stag Hunt 
individuals face immediate rewards but with smaller gains through defecting 
from the group while cooperation leads to larger gains for the entire group.   
 Through analysing the DSM in the WTO through the game theoretical 
approach of Stag Hunt, the aim of this thesis is hence to try to contribute in 
providing a greater and deeper understanding of the decisions made by the 
member states in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Analysing the 
disputes cases from 1995-2012, this study further aims to investigate if there are 
any differences in behaviour depending on income of the member states in the 
DSM, before and after the Great Recession. 
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1.1 Related Literature 
Many scholars have written about the link between international regimes and 
states’ responses to crises, where the key work is that of Gourevitch. In his text 
he presented a framework of how states respond in crisis, which is most 
applicable in current financial crisis (Gourevitch, 1986).  
More recent academic literature has also started to explore the political 
and economical motivations for international trade (Gould & Woodbridge, 1998; 
Sevilla, 1998). With the creation of the WTO and the dispute settlement process, 
a wider focus has in academic literature been given to the political and 
economical strategies made in international regimes. During the last 10 to 15 
years, the behaviour of states has been a subject of interest in both political and 
economic science; hence, there are a number of empirical studies that deals with 
somewhat related issues to the dispute settlements in the WTO. During the past 
few years, Leither and Lester have presented yearly statistical analysis of the 
WTO dispute settlement. They present, in brief, summarized data and examine 
which countries who have submitted the largest number of complaints and how 
the decisions are made regarding the complaints they are party to (Leitner & 
Lester, 2012). In 2005 scholars studied if the outcomes of the dispute settlement 
in WTO were biased or not, and how this would affect the future outcome for 
the role of the WTO dispute settlement (Horn, Mavridos, & Nordström, 2005).  
In another study, the enforcement of the dispute settlement was seen as 
excessive when liberal trade has become the subject of interest for all members, 
and will thus in the future lead to full compliance in disputes by all states 
(Pauwelyn, 2008). Moonhawk on the other hand, argues that countries with 
greater economic capacity are more likely to utilize dispute settlement in the 
WTO than developing countries, and that the transformation of the WTO has 
mostly benefited developing countries (Moonhawk, 2008). In 2004, Narlikar and 
Odell investigated how strategic choices are made by developing countries in 
multilateral negotiation processes and showed through a game theoretic 
approach how a developing country coalition will gain less when having a strict 
distributive strategy in trade negotiations (Narlikar & Odell, 2006). Rose also 
found that states that joined the WTO does not exhibit particularly different 
trade patterns after joining the WTO, nor are they more liberal with respect to 
protectionist measures than non WTO members (Rose, 2004). This therefore 
challenges WTO’s impact on the increasing trade flows, and also the welfare of 
its member states according to Grinols and Perrelli (2005).   
 In the master’s thesis Rules of the game from 2008, Lannerberth also 
used a game theoretical approach in order to try to explain behaviour of the 
member states in the DS. Through analysing the years between 1995 and 2004 
and applying a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PG) game, the author finds that there is a 
rather strong correlation between the theoretic model and reality. 
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1.2 Aim and Purpose 
The aim of this study is to address some of the questions raised by previous 
studies through investigating if the behaviour and decision-making of WTO 
members in the Dispute Settlement Body can be explained using the game 
theoretical approach of Stag Hunt (SH). Game theory is a useful, diverse and 
applicable theory that can be applied on many subjects in the range of political 
and social sciences (Varoufakis, 2008). The purpose of this study is therefore to, 
based on previous studies - especially Lannerberth (2008) - investigate if it is 
possible to further explain the behaviour of member states in the WTO dispute 
settlement by applying the theoretical model of SH on the dispute cases, and 
thereby strengthen the usefulness of game theory when studying international 
relations.   
Lannerberth writes that ”[a]s the outcomes of cooperative games depend 
on the agreements negotiated between the players it is impossible to say 
anything about the outcomes of such a game without knowing these 
agreement.[…]Because of these limitations of cooperative games, all games in 
the thesis are assumed to be noncooperative” (Lannerberth, 2008). However, in 
this thesis it will be argued that the Stag Hunt (a coordination game) is a more 
suitable model in explaining the Dispute Settlement. A coordination game is 
both a non-cooperative and a cooperative game, which means that states can face 
mutual gains, but only through making mutually consistent decisions. Since the 
negotiation in the Dispute Settlement can be seen as consistent, where the 
outcome of one negotiation implicates the outcome of the next negotiation 
between the states, a coordination game is more suitable for explaining the DSB.  
 Through observing a longer time period than previous studies, and hence 
accounting for more disputes cases, the ambition of the study is also to 
investigate whether there is a difference in behaviour depending on economical 
status of the country and if the economical and political effects of the Great 
Recession in 2008-2009, has effected the strategic behaviour of the member 
states in the DS. 
1.3 Research Question 
In light of previous research and the aim of this study, one main research 
questions and two sub-questions have been formulated. The questions have been 
put as follows: 
 
• Can the game theoretic approach of Stag Hunt further explain the 
behaviour of WTO members in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism? 
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— If so, is there a difference in strategic behaviour between member 
states depending on their GNI per capita in the Dispute Settlement?  
 
— If so, is there a difference in strategic behaviour between member 
states before and after the Great Recession in the Dispute 
Settlement? 
1.4 Material  
The empirical framework regarding the different disputes has been collected 
through reports and statistical documentation from the WTO website, where 
complete lists of the disputes are published. The disputes have then been put into 
quantitative form in the form of excel spread sheets, suitable for statistic and 
game theoretic analysis1.  
 The study doesn’t aim to compare the statistical result from this study 
with previous results. Instead, the statistical result will serve as a platform for 
answering the questions raised in this study.  
 The time frame of the dispute case date ranges from January 1995 to 
December 2012. The years are chosen to give a complete and accurate picture of 
how the settlements have been and are made in the WTO. The study has thus 
chosen not to include cases from 2013 or 2014. This is because the study was 
started before the end of 2013, which meant that some of the cases were not 
finished. Since this study aims to show an accurate and complete picture of how 
many disputes that have taken place during the years, the cases from 2013 and 
onwards are excluded.   
All states that were or became members of the WTO during the chosen 
period are included in this study. In total, the disputes from 1995 to 2012 amount 
to 454 cases2. 
1.5 Limitations 
There are some limitations to both the material and the analysis applied in this 
study. The first limitation concerning the material has its origin in the fact that 
the available information regarding the disputes are not as detailed as one would 
have wished, and hence a more complete picture of the strategies in the dispute 
settlement is not available.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
1 Some of the spreadsheet is shown in appendix B, table 10 and 11 
2 For further information regarding the distribution of the cases between the years 1995-2012, se appendix B. 
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 Some of the larger economies, such as China and Russia, did not join the 
WTO until recently. Therefore, there can also be a somewhat incorrect image as 
to which countries are the most active in the disputes. Using a long time period 
in this study, the aim is to minimize these incorrect images of the countries 
involved in disputes. To continue to analyze the evolvement of members’ 
participation would hence be of great interest in order to truly capture the 
essence of the activities in the disputes.  
 Through not analyzing the countries solely by themselves and instead in 
groups of income, the aim is to give an indication of which type of country from 
which income group that are the most active in the dispute settlement in the 
WTO.  
It is my belief that the limitations and choices made in the material will not 
affect the result of the study.  
1.5.1 Definition of Country  
The WTO has no specific classification of member states depending on income 
or development level. Instead, member states announce themselves whether they 
are developed or developing countries (WTO B, 2014). Since being a developing 
country in WTO brings certain special rights, some countries choose to label 
themselves as such, even though it could be strongly questioned (Kasteng, 
Karlsson, & Lindberg, 2004). To be able to analyse how the economic status of 
the countries affects their behaviour in the DSB, the different countries have in 
this study been divided into four income categories: “low income economies” 
(LIE), “lower middle income economies” (LMI), “upper middle income 
economies” (UMI) and “high income economies” (HIE). The division is made 
by the World Bank, and uses GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank 
Atlas method3, as an indicator of division. The different income groups that the 
World Bank use are: low income, $1,035 or less; lower middle income, $1,036-
4,085; upper middle income, $4,086-$12,615; and high income, $12,616 or more 
(The World Bank, 2014). Using the definition from the World Bank contributes 
to give a clear and comprehensive image of the economic situation in the 
different countries and can hopefully provide a useful clarification to why the 
states act as they do in the DSM. 
The World Bank’s group division of income is however not a completely 
unquestioned method. Using the division by income, important issues such as 
inequality, human development, social exclusion, and government capacity are 
ignored which are just as important factors as GNI per capita when it comes to 
measuring the development status of a country. The cut-off points can also be 
questioned, since countries with an income of $4,085 on average will be seen as 
lower middle income countries, while having average income of $4,090 makes 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 For further information regarding the World Bank Atlas method see: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/world-bank-atlas-method  
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the country a upper middle income. Even though the differences in income are 
small, the different group division has a major impact in the classification of the 
country and its political and economical situation.   
However, the use of this classification does not imply a judgement 
concerning the development conditions of any country, which earlier 
classifications has made, and in this study it serves as a useful way of 
summarizing trends across a wide range of development indicators.  
In summary, this study will use the four different groups as created by the 
World Bank. However, in some parts of the study the two lowest income groups 
will be combined and the two higher income groups will be combined in order to 
give a more comprehensive image of the disputes through reducing the amount 
of actors.  
1.6 Method and Material  
This study can be considered theory-testing, meaning that game theory will be 
applied on the material to see if it can explain the decision-making in the dispute 
settlement of the WTO or not. By using a statistical approach with a large set of 
cases, the study can test if the cases can be explained through the chosen theory 
and thus give the theory empirical support (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, & 
Wängnerud, 2009).  
1.7 Outline of the study 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: part two will provide a 
background of WTO and its dispute settlement system. In the third part, game 
theory will be presented in order to serve as the theoretical framework. The 
fourth part describes the methodology, where the extensive and strategic form of 
game theory is showed and how it applies to decision-making. In the fifth part, 
the analyses will be conducted by presenting a statistical analysis of the dispute 
settlement cases and then an application of the extensive game on the settlement. 
In the sixth and seventh part results, implications and a conclusion will be made.  
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2 Background 
In order to understand the dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization 
works and how it relates to game theory, a shorter background of the WTO and 
the dispute settlement will be presented in this chapter. 
2.1 WTO 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a multilateral organization for trade 
liberalization. It has its origin in the 1986-94 negotiations of the Uruguay Round 
and the earlier negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GATT was a trade liberalization agreement developed from the 
Bretton Woods agreement in 1947. WTO’s overarching purpose is to help trade 
flows to move as freely as possible, since improving trade flows is an important 
tool for facilitating trade and hence economic growth in the increasingly 
interdependent global economy (Hippler Bello, 1996; Sterling-Folker, 2010). 
The organization is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements and a 
place for states to settle different trade disputes, giving each member state equal 
votes (Hippler Bello, 1996). Through agreements and negotiations, signed by the 
member states, the documents provide the legal framework within which 
international commerce happens and binds governments to keep their trade 
policies within agreed limits  (Lee, 2011). Overall, the WTO operations are 
premised on the neo-liberal idea that all nations benefit from free and open trade, 
and it is dedicated to reducing, and ultimately eliminating, barriers to trade.   
Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. To solve these 
differences, WTO has established dispute settlement processes for its members 
to solve trade disputes that may occur between the countries in order to reduce 
trade barriers, eliminate protectionism and increase economic development 
(Ritzer, 2011).  
2.2 Dispute Settlement  
The Dispute Settlement System (DSS) is one of the central pillars of the 
multilateral trading system. Without this rules-based system, the WTO would be 
less effective since the rules and regulation of the WTO could not be enforced 
upon its member states (WTO, 2013). 
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When a member state believes that another member state is violating 
WTO’s agreements and regulations, making the first member state deprived of 
the benefits related to trade, the first member state can pursue three different 
strategies. The member state can either decide to not carry out any sanctions 
against the accused country; or the countries can try to solve the problem 
bilaterally; or lastly, the member state can take the conflict to WTO for problem 
solving. It is when the country choses the last option, that the conflict ends up in 
the Dispute Settlement System. 
The DSS is based on rules and the priority of the system is to settle 
disputes, through consultations if possible. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
is responsible for settling the disputes and consists of all the WTO members. 
The DSB monitors the implementation of rulings and recommendation, and has 
the power to authorize relation when a state does not comply with the rulings 
(WTO, 2013).   
2.2.1 Proceeding of Dispute Settlement  
The rules and proceeding of the DSS can be summarized in the following steps: 
  
1. When the complaint is made to the WTO, the disputing parties first have 
to meet in order to see if it is possible to solve the conflict through 
consultation and mediation.  
2. If the consultation fails, the second step is for the DSB to appoint and 
establish a panel, which consists of three trade policy experts. The panel 
has then six months to hear the disputing parties, examine the case and 
come to a conclusion. The conclusions are published in a report, which 
specifies if and in what ways the accused member state has violated the 
WTO agreements or not. 
3. Both parties can appeal the report from the panel if they believe that the 
interpretation by the panel of the relevant agreements is incorrect. If the 
report is not appealed, three of the seven permanent members of the 
Appellate Body have 90 days to examine the case and verify if the panel 
report is correctly made. The decisions of the Appellate Body are 
published in a new report.  
4. If the responding member state is found guilty, the country is 
recommended to correct the measures, which is determined by the DSB. 
If the complainant is not satisfied with the outcome, the state can either 
choose to report to DSB again (which means that the issue will be treated 
in the same way as the original complaint in step 2); or the state can 
pledge the Appellate Body of permission to start retaliation measures 
against the respondent. If the complaint is approved, the complainant is 
supposed to be compensated4.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Illustrating image of the panel process is presented in Appendix A 
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2.3 Dispute Settlement and the Great Recession 
The Great Recession hit the global economy in 2008, making trade flows 
collapse across all the regions of the world while increasing the uncertainty 
regarding trade policies on the global market (Bown, 2011). Strong economic 
interdependence between countries meant that the crisis instantly became a 
global problem and hence an important problem for the WTO to cope with 
(Meunier, 2009). During the crisis WTO has allowed member states to apply 
temporary trade barriers if certain conditions are met, which has served as an 
important part in upholding the free trade regime and avoiding protectionism in 
the time of crisis.  
 However, as there are always winners under such a regime like WTO, 
there are also losers. In recent years, the biggest criticism towards the WTO has 
been that due to the economic recession, more and more countries have 
gradually introduced more protectionist measures, which often have hit the most 
vulnerable countries, without receiving major implications from the WTO.   
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3 THEORY 
This chapter will present a general theoretical background on game theory, how 
it emerged and how it can be used to explain the decision-making in the dispute 
settlement.   
3.1 Game Theory 
The behaviour and interactions among individuals, organizations or states are 
often complex in their nature. Many scholars have studied the ways in which 
individuals, or agents, interact strategically using game theory, since it 
highlights the cooperative difficulties of these agents. Game theory can be seen 
as a subcategory to Rational Choice Theory since they share the same 
positivistic view of the state of the world, or rather, game theory can be seen as 
the application of rational decision theory (Binnmore, 2009). Traditional game 
theory proceeds from strong assumptions about human rationality in order to 
make strong conclusions about the nature of equilibrium (McCain, 2009). The 
field of game theory first received attention through the book Theory of Games 
and Economic Behaviour in 1944 by Neumann and Morgenstern and throughout 
the years many different evolvements of these theories have developed. Game 
theory can be used to analyse strategic interactions between individuals when 
making decisions, in order to either predict or explain the actions of the agents 
involved and can be used to explain how effective sanctions are in international 
relations (Fink, Gates, & Humes, 1998). In game theory, the agents’ rewards, or 
pay-offs, when committing different strategies are shown in payoff-matrixes 
with columns and rows denoting different choices (Dodge, 2012). 
Since the 1940s several different game theories have evolved. The most 
well-known game is the non-cooperative game Prisoner’s Dilemma, where 
agents act with deliberate secrecy and distrust one another and choose to not 
cooperate.   
In cooperative game theory, the agents can form coalitions and thus choose 
to either cooperate or defect, together. When a coalition can be formed, the 
expectation is that by working together and choosing a joint strategy they will 
improve the overall outcome. The advantages of using game theoretic tools 
when conducting studies on decision making, is that it effectively isolates real 
world phenomena to simple models that can be thoroughly analysed. Scholars 
have then discovered that iteration makes actors less likely to defect from 
cooperative arrangements than actors engaged in one-shot relationship (Marrow, 
1994). The recurrent ability for international institutions to exchange 
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information, as well as monitor state behaviour, reduces concerns over actual 
intentions and the consequence of being cheated by constant and regular 
meetings. 
3.1.1 Game Theory and Utility 
In game theory, international cooperation has a state-centric perspective, which 
considers the state to be a unitary, rational and utility-maximizing actor. Utility 
can be defined as preferences or the payoffs when making different decisions. 
These preferences can be seen as explaining the economic behaviour or motive 
of the states or other agents (Varian, 2006; Feltovich, Iwasaki, & Oda, 2012). 
The utilities can be assigned values, which thereby can be ranked by the value of 
preference. To describe the value of the different decisions, a utility function can 
be made. If the outcomes of the decisions are uncertain, the states must take 
different probabilities into account. An example of this function is when the 
utility (u) of a certain decision (d) can be seen as a function of the different 
outcomes (x) times the probability (p) of the different outcome. This can be 
shown by the following equation 1 and through the summation of the decisions 
in equation 2.  
 
(1) ! ! = !!  ×  !! + !!  ×  !! +⋯!!  ×  !! 
 
(2) ! ! = (!! ×  !!) 
3.1.2 Game Theory and Rationality  
 
In game theory, agents, or in this case states, can be assumed to make its 
decisions based on rational self-interest in consistency with strategic cost-benefit 
analysis of possible choices and outcomes (Sterling-Folker, 2010). In a study 
made by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberg (1997), rationality of states is defined 
as making “consistent, ordered preferences, and that they [states] calculate costs 
and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in 
view of those preferences. Egoism means then that their utility functions are 
independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the 
gains or losses of others” (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberg, 1997, s. 29) 
This clarification can be used in illustrating the fundamental motives as 
regards to why states want to establish cooperation and international regimes 
(Keohane, 1984). However, cooperation of states is not always easy to achieve. 
States may fail to cooperate because they lack information about another state’s 
true preference. States may also fear that others will take advantage of a 
cooperative arrangement by cheating or that others will free ride on their 
cooperative efforts. Therefore, even when all actors share the same interests and 
would gain from a cooperative effort, there are still significant barriers to the 
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ability of self-interested states to cooperate. Since states cannot trust the future 
intentions of their cooperative partners, states will avoid potential agreements if 
they involve different potential pay-off levels (ibid). Using a game-theoretical 
model to explain the main reasoning behind cooperation and defection can 
therefore prove useful.   
3.1.3 Criticism of Game Theory 
 
The criticism most often presented against the use of game theory is that the real 
world is far more complex than what is explained in the game theoretic models 
and can hence paint a narrow picture of the world. Other scholars also argue that 
the assumptions made in game theory are often not relevant in empirical studies. 
The theory is also based on rationality, which means that the actors will always 
act to individual gain as much as possible in every situation, regardless of how it 
affects others. This assumption can be questioned, since empirical studies shows 
that policy makers often don’t make the “rational” decisions that are a 
prerequisite in game theory (Fors, 1997). There are constant difficulties to using 
game theory in that the modelling is defining, limiting and isolating for almost 
all set of factors and variables that influence the strategic outcome. When 
conducting a study, there will always be factors that cannot be accounted for. 
Using a game theoretic model in the study, important aspects may be excluded 
which can impact the result.  
 However, game theory contributes to political science, since it lets 
scholars focus on specific events and certain aspects, and can be a useful tool 
when studying subjects such as cooperation, trust or trade.  
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4 Method 
In this chapter the methodology of game theory will be discussed, explaining the 
theory-testing approach of the paper and motivating the theory and case 
selection further.  
4.1 Game Theory and WTO’s Dispute Settlement  
In Jean-Jacque Rousseau’s Discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality 
among men from 1755, the story behind the stag hunt game is given: 
 
If a group of hunters set out to take a stag, they are fully aware that they would 
all have to remain faithfully at their posts in order to succeed; but if a hare 
happens to pass near one of them, there can be no doubt that he pursued it 
without qualm, and that once he had caught his pray, he cared very little whether 
or not he had made his companions miss theirs (Stirling, 2012, s. 190). 
 
Despite the collective benefits that can be obtained by removing trade barriers 
and liberalising trade, coordinating trade liberalization can be relatively difficult 
to achieve and maintain. There are often domestic producers that pressure 
governments for protectionism. A form of game theory that can explain these 
difficulties is the game Stag Hunt which describes a conflict between safety and 
social cooperation (Osborne, 2004). In the original game, which was presented 
by Rousseau in the quote above, hunters must cooperate in order to provide stag 
that would contribute considerable gains for all of them. However, any 
individual hunter may be tempted to defect by unilaterally pursuing a rabbit, 
which will cause the stag hunt to fail. By defecting, the hunter will be provided 
with immediate gains, but ultimately short-lived and comparatively smaller 
gains (Skyrms, 2009).  
In trade liberalization, the same theory can be applied since all 
participants can obtain comparatively greater aggregate gains if they reduce 
barriers to trade, yet in the face of immediate domestic pressure, a state can be 
tempted to resort to protectionism. By pursuing the short-term interest, all states 
end up being economically worse off through the use of protectionism (Gates & 
Humes, 1997). 
Since the creation of the WTO, the organization has served as the 
primary international institution through which the normative and behavioural 
expectations of global free trade has been extended and affirmed, and thus it 
should be possible to apply the game theoretical framework of Stag Hunt to the 
dispute settlement.  
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4.1.1 Strategic Form of the Games  
To illustrate the Stag Hunt (SH) game further, the table below shows the 
strategic form of the game in a payoff matrix. A strategic game is a model of 
interacting decision-makers or agents. The two states in the dispute are 
illustrated as agent A and agent B. Each of the agents must choose an action 
without knowing the choice of the other.  
 
Table 1. Stag Hunt 
 
Stag Hunt-Game Setting 
 
Agent B 
 
  Stag (Cooperation) Hare (Defect)   
Agent A Stag (Cooperation) 5, 5 0, 3   
 Hare (Defect) 3, 0 3, 3   
 
In the table, the number on the left in each square denotes agent A’s gain in the  
game, whereas the number on the right denotes agent B’s gain.  
Assuming that agents are rational actors, it is possible to investigate their 
different strategies. If the agents are well informed and rational, they will make 
their decision so as to try to maximize their own gain in the SH. This means that 
they will not only make the choice that maximizes their profit, but also make the 
choice which maximize their profit depending on what they believe will be their 
counterparts’ choice. This type of strategy is called a Nash equilibrium, and 
means that neither agent has a unilateral incentive to change his/her strategy.  
The widely known Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game that previous studies 
have used, is a non-cooperative game where the agents will choose not to 
cooperate and hence only have one Nash-equilibrium; when both agent defect.  
 
Table 2. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Setting 
 
Agent B 
  Cooperate Defect   
Agent A Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5   
 Defect 5, 0 1, 1   
 
The SH game thus differs from the PD in that there are two Nash equilibriums; 
when both players cooperate and when both players defect (stag, stag) and 
(hare, hare). Hunting stag appears to be a possible outcome since both would be 
worse off defecting and hunting hare, but if both agents believe that the other 
agent will hunt hare and thus defect, each is better off hunting hare (Fudenberg 
& Tirole, 1993).  
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To see why, the situation of agent A is described. If agent B chooses to 
cooperate, agent A will cooperate since 5 is better than 3. If agent B chooses to 
defect, agent A is also better off to defect than cooperate since 3 is better than 0 
(Varian, 2006, pp. 504-518); there are hence two Nash equilibrium (NE). This 
type of game is usually defined as an assurance game or coordination game. 
Another useful concept is Pareto efficiency, which defines a situation where no 
actor can be made better off without making someone else worse off. In Stag 
Hunt, the preferences of stag-stag is Pareto efficient but the hare-hare 
preferences can be considered as being risk efficient (Rajko, 2012) since when 
choosing hare (or when states choose protectionism), there is no risk of being 
left with nothing, which is the case when choosing stag (or not implementing 
trade barriers when everyone else have implemented them). In the PD setting 
above, there is one Pareto efficient allocation: when both actors choose to 
cooperate. If both players cooperate, no player can be made better off without 
making the other actor worse off (Varian, 2006 p. 15). Therefore, even though 
both players would be better off cooperating, as rational actors they would 
instead choose to defect; thus ending up in a Pareto inefficient allocation.  
4.1.2 Extensive Form of the Games  
In its extensive form, the different choices are formed into a game tree. In figure 
1 the two games; PD and SH have been combined into one large extensive game 
in order to compare the two games and their outcome. Each new tip of the line is 
a node where a player can make different choices. When a game is finished, the 
payoff of the strategies is shown below. The extensive game setting is very 
similar between the two games and hence the only difference is the outcome; i.e. 
two NE in the SH and one NE in the PD.  
 
Figure 1. Extensive form of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt 
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
w
n
 
s
ource: own illustration 
  16 
4.1.3 The use of Stag Hunt versus Prisoner’s Dilemma on the DSM  
The fundamental role of the dispute settlement in the WTO is to facilitate and 
support trade liberalization and cooperation between member states. In order to 
analyse the behaviour of the member states, it is thus of importance to use a 
suitable game theory model that captures all the aspects of the dispute 
settlement.  
 The most widely used game model for analysing the nature of state 
behaviour is the PD. Through using a PD game analysis, it can be seen as if the 
member states always will favour protectionism or other measures that states 
view as favourable for their own self-interest through the concerns for relative 
gains (Powell, 1991). Countries prefer to limit other states’ access to their own 
markets while attaining unrestricted access to trading partners. In the game 
setting of the PD, states have a dominant strategy to defect, so cooperation fails 
and the potential gains from international trade are lost. Liberal trade would only 
be achieved if a mutual agreement were made with an outcome that would be 
best for both of the member states. This would thus imply a strong enforcement 
mechanism, as there would be member states tempted to defect from the 
agreements.  
 However, if member states instead saw liberal trade as in both of their 
interests, the use of a PD game would not be suitable for explaining the dispute 
settlement in the WTO, but rather a Stag Hunt game. In a coordination game 
such as the SH, states share a common interest in coordinating their activities 
(McAdams, 2008). In the SH all states realize that liberal trade is in their own 
interest and hence, in game theoretical terms, this implies that hunting a stag 
together would be more beneficial than defecting and hunting a hare. In this 
situation, cooperation between the states would also be easier to achieve, since 
they would be able to assure each other through the absolute gains from the 
liberal trade.  
 Even though PD is widely known and cited, the cooperative outcome in 
SH might be seen as providing a better model for situations where cooperation is 
difficult but still possible(Kuhn, 2014). Hence, SH are more suitable for 
explaining the trade disputes in the DSB and can be considered as being more 
realistic and helpful in understanding international regimes.  
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5 Analysis 
To be able to conduct a thorough investigation of how well the game theoretical 
framework applies on the dispute settlement, a brief statistical analysis is made 
on the DSM, followed by an application of an extensive game.  
5.1 Statistical analysis of the DSM 
In table 3, a summation of the disputes in the WTO, between 1995-2012, is 
displayed5. As can be seen in the table, only 38% of all the member states have 
taken part in the disputes during this period. Only 0,2% of the low-income 
economies participated in a dispute, while between 38-50 % of the other income 
group countries participated. This shows that the there is a strong correlation 
between the income of the country and participation in the dispute settlement. As 
can be seen in appendix B, countries such as United States represent 25 % of the 
complainants and 31% in the respondent cases in the disputes. Not far behind 
comes the EU, while most of the low-income economies never have participated 
as neither complainants nor respondents. The statistics is however somewhat 
irregular. The EU acts as a joint actor for the EU member states in the WTO, but 
before many European countries joined the EU they participated in the dispute 
settlement as single countries. The entire activeness of European states is hence 
not completely captured by the EU, making EU look less active in the dispute 
settlement than what is actually the case.  
 
Table 3. Summation of disputes  
Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
 
Figure 2 and 3 shows the evolvement of the dispute cases in the DSB from 1995 to 
2012. During these years, WTO has gone from 112 member states to 157 where most 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 For a more detailed image of the member states participation in the dispute settlement, see appendix B.  
 All countries LIE LME MHI HIE 
Number of member states 159 27 37 37 58 
Participated in a least one dispute  38 % 0,2% 38% 40,5% 50% 
Participated as complainant 28% 0,2% 35% 38% 31% 
Participated as respondent  29% 0 24% 38% 41% 
Participated as both complainant and respondent 19% 0 19% 35% 19% 
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of the new members come from lower income groups. The figures show an overall 
low participation of the LIE group throughout the years. During the beginning of the 
obeserved period, high-income economies were dominant in the dispute settlement, as 
both complainant and respondent. Over the years the number of disputes has evened 
out between the different groups. The participation of low-income economies still 
remains low as both complainant and respondent. During recent years, however, an 
increased amount of participants has been seen from lower-middle and upper-middle 
income economies.  
 There are few effects from the Great Recession that can be deduced on 
the amount of disputes. There is a decrease in the number of disputes among the high-
income countries, at the beginning of the recession. However, it is difficult to 
determine whether this is an effect of the economic crisis or the effect of a longer 
downward trend in number of disputes. With the slow recovery of the economies in 
2011 and 2012, the number of disputes seems however to be rising in number. 
 
 Figure 2. Evolvement of disputes by complainant, 1995-2012 
 Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
 
Figure 3. Evolvement of disputes by respondent, 1995-2012 
  Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
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Table 4. Status of cases 
 
 Amount Percent 
Settled cases 91 20% 
No settlement, no panel 137 30% 
Establishment of panel 226 50% 
Total sum 454 100% 
  Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
 
In table 4, the status of the member states’ different cases is shown.6 The table 
shows that only 20 % of all the cases in the dispute settlement are settled and can 
thereby be regarded as finished. Most of the cases are not settled and are still 
proceeding, which shows to prove that the dispute settlement is not as efficient 
and fast moving as one might wish.  
 
Table 5. Status of cases divided by income of the countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
 
In table 5, one can observe if the status of the cases differ depending on the 
economic situation of the different countries, i.e. if there are differences in how 
the cases have proceeded, depending on which income group the countries 
involved belong to. Since there were few dispute cases from LIE and LMI 
countries and since the table would have been very extensive with different 
combinations of few cases, the table combines the two lower income groups as 
well as the HIE and MHI groups together for easier comparison. The numbers in 
brackets are the actual number of cases. The table shows a higher probability of 
settled cases if the state was high and upper-middle income country, than if the 
complaint was made by a low and lower-middle income economy. What is also 
shown in the table is that when the lower income group is making the complaint, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 A more detailed summarize of the procedures of the member states cases are presented in Appendix C.  
 
Status of Cases 
Proceedings 
Settled Cases No settlement, 
no panel 
Establishment 
of panel 
Total Sum 
Complainant: LIE + LMI 
Respondent: LIE+ LMI 
0% 
(0) 
100% 
(4) 
0% 
(0) 
100% 
(4) 
Complainant: LIE + LMI 
Respondent: UMI+ HIE 
15.5% 
(7) 
35.5% 
(16) 
49% 
(22) 
100 % 
(45) 
Complainant: UMI + HIE 
Respondent: UMI+ HIE 
21% 
(76) 
29% 
(103) 
50% 
(181) 
100% 
(360) 
Complainant: UMI + HIE 
Respondent: LIE+ LMI 
18% 
(8) 
31% 
(14) 
51% 
(23) 
100% 
(45) 
Total Sum 91 137 226 100% 
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there is a great risk of the case to be faced with no settlement, or at the best, an 
establishment of a panel. In most cases the income group will face no settlement 
in their disputes.  
In those cases where a panel is established, a report should be made where 
the panel’s conclusions regarding the case are made. In table 6 the panel’s 
judgements of the cases are shown. In 226 cases where a panel was established, 
most of the reports (81%) were approved. If “not yet a report” had been 
eliminated from the table, the approved reports would have been accounted for 
85 % of the cases, which show that if a report is made, it is likely to be 
approved. 
 
Table 6. Status of reports from approved panel 
 
 Amount Percentage 
Approved 182 81% 
Dismissed 32 14% 
Not yet a report 12 5% 
Total Sum 226 100% 
Source: WTO, 2012 
 
When reports are made either approving or dismissing the disputes, both parties 
can appeal the case to the Appellate Body. In table 7, it is shown that respondent 
appeals when the report has approved the dispute and the complainant appeals 
when the case has been dismissed.  
 
Table 7. Appeal to Appellate Body 
 Appeal to Appellate Body  
 
Total 
No Appeal Complainant 
Appeal 
Respondent 
Appeal 
Appeal by 
both parts 
Judgment 
of case 
Approved 71 8 102 1 182 
Dismissed 13 19 0 0 32 
Total 84 27 102 1 214 
Source: WTO, 2012; WTO D, 2014 
 
If the respondent is found guilty after the report(s), the DSB stipulates that the 
member state has to comply with the ruling. In article 21 in the rules of 
membership in the WTO, it is written that “[p]rompt compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective 
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members” (WTO A, 2014). For the 
first ten years, the DSB had a compliance rate of 83 % (Dewey, 2009), however, 
when analysing the status of present cases, it shows that half of the present cases 
can be seen as being complied to.  
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Table 8. Compliance of present cases 
 
 Amount Percentage 
Compliance 28 53% 
Non-compliance 25 47% 
Total 53 100% 
Source: WTO, 2012 
5.2 Application of the extensive game-setting 
The entire extensive game applied on the DSB is shown in appendix D, figure 5 
and shows a similar setting to that which was presented in Lannerberths study. 
  
 In figure 5, the complainant’s (C) payoff is first shown in the brackets to 
the left. From the beginning complainant’s costs for disputing will be zero when 
not choosing to proceed. The only cost that C will face will be c, the economic 
impact of the respondent (R)’s trade measures. R’s, however, will have a payoff 
of r when the complainant chooses not to take the trade dispute to the DSB. If C 
chooses to proceed with the dispute, the costs will accumulate throughout the 
dispute.  
 If the states are able to settle the dispute in the second node, the 
complainant will receive c-d, i.e. the amount demanded as compensation for the 
trade losses, minus the dispute costs and the respondent will “receive” r-c-d.  
 If the disputes continue to reach the panel, the agent’s payoff will depend 
strictly on the panel’s report (in some cases also the Appellate Body’s report) 
and if the respondent is willing to comply with the verdict or not. If the 
respondent does not comply with the judgement made, the compliance can take 
three different actions; either do nothing at all, conduct counter measures against 
the respondent and cause negative trade effects on the respondent, or the state 
can conduct implementation appeals. Making an implementation appeal will 
certainly lead to higher dispute costs for the complainant and the process is not 
as clear and transparent as for previous options, and is hence associated with a 
greater economic risk for the complainant.  
5.3 Simplification of the extensive game 
As can be seen in figure 5, most of the important decisions in the DSB are made 
by the Panel and Appellate Body and not by the two agents (the complainant and 
the respondent). In order to truly understand how the agents strategically think in 
the decision-making, a simplification of the game will be made. Through the 
implementation of a chance node (CH), the models lets chance decide whether 
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the filed complainant will be accepted or not, instead of the Appellate Body or 
Panel. A chance node can be seen as a node that identifies an event in a decision 
tree where a degree of uncertainty exists, and represents at least two possible 
outcomes (Hammond & Zank, 2014). The chance node doesn’t only reduce the 
agents; it can be used in order to find the utilities of the two agents in the game 
too (Lannerberth, 2008). In figure 4, the new reduced game can be seen where 
the unknown dispute costs can be summarized to zd. The broken lines in the 
figure symbolizes that the agent in a certain node cannot determine which of the 
options the agent is positioned at, i.e. if the case can be considered as being 
“good” or “bad”, where the good implies wining the case.  
 
Figure 4. Reduced game of the dispute settlement 
Source: Own illustration, originally from Lannerberth 2008 
5.3.1 Backward induction: first node 
The strategic decision-making can be evaluated using backward induction, i.e. 
through evaluating the strategies starting from the end of the game. The 
complainant’s different decisions can result in three different utility functions. 
When there is no panel established the complainants utility function is: 
 
(3) ! !"  !"#$% = −! 
 
If however, a panel is established the outcome for the complainant may either 
be: 
(4) ! !"#$%!!!"  !"#$ = (! − !") or  
(5) ! !"#$%!"#  !"#$ = (−!") 
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Depending if the case can be considered being a good or a bad case, comparing 
the utility functions with the different probabilities of the outcomes, a utility 
function can be made: 
(6) ! !"#$% = ! ! − !" + 1− ! −!" = !" − !"# − !" + !"# =!" − !" 
 
Supposing that the complainant is rational in its actions, the state knows that it 
should proceed to establish a panel if the utility for doing so is higher then not, 
hence if;  
(7) !! − !" >   −!.  
 
It can thus seem irrational for the state to choose the option of not establishing a 
panel, since the state would be better off not engaging in the dispute at all. When 
not disputing the outcome would be 0 instead of –!.  
5.3.2 Backward induction: second node 
The second node can be seen as the negotiating node. The negotiation is related 
to the variable n that is included in figure 6.  Both agents can affect the value of 
variable n. In the dispute the complainant would prefer n=0 whereas the 
respondent would prefer n=c. In the game, the complainant will however not 
accept an output where (! − ! − ! > !" − !"). This implies that the 
complainant will only accept a solution when (! < ! − !" + !" − !). The 
decision by the respondent will depend on which of the outputs the agent 
prefers; either that of a settlement or that of the establishment of a panel. If a 
panel is established the utility is either:  
(8) ! !"#$%!""#  !"#$ = !(! − ! − !")  or  
(9) ! !"#$%!"#  !"#$ = (1− !)(! − !") 
Hence the entire utility function for the respondent when not settling, can be 
seen as: 
(10) ! !!"#$ = ! ! − ! − !" + 1− ! ! − !" =   ! − !" − !" 
The respondent will however settle when the utility for settlement is higher than 
establishing(! − ! + ! − ! > ! − !" − !"), otherwise the respondent will 
choose to continue to the panel.  
5.3.3 Backward induction: third node 
In the first node when the complainant chooses whether the state should make a 
complaint or not, there are two different utility functions:  
 
(11) ! !"##$"%"&# = ! − ! − !, if the respondent want to settle, or: 
(12) ! !"#$% = !" − !", if the respondent doesn’t want to settle.  
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If we can assume a situation of perfect information (i.e. that both states know the 
strategy of the other state), the choice of the complainant is fairly easy to make. 
If the utility function exceeds zero, the state should make the complainant and if 
the outcome is less than zero, the complainant should not make a complaint.  
5.3.4 Strategic form and Nash equilibrium 
The extensive game, which has been explained in the previous parts can also be 
shown in a strategic form.  
 
Table 9. Strategic Form 
 
Respondent 
 
  Settlement (S) No settlement (NS)  
 Complaint, no panel (CNP) ! − ! − !;   ! − ! + ! − ! – !; ! − !   
Complainant Complaint, panel (CP) ! − ! − !; ! − ! + ! − ! !"– !"; ! − !" − !"   
 No complaint (NP) (!; !) (!; !)   
 
In the strategic form, the NE can be found which shows the most rational 
strategies for both of the member states. In the table there are four NE in the 
decision-game.  
However, what can be seen from the statistical analyses and from the 
models when accounting for the NE, is that it seems most likely that most of the 
states will choose either (CP; S) or (CP; NS). 
These strategies which are shown in the strategic form are in line with 
the theories of Stag Hunt; since it shows that there can be more than one Nash 
equilibrium.  
Making a complaint and then having no panel will never be rational for 
the complainant and hence there cannot be a NE. However, if the complainant 
chooses to have a panel, the respondent are willing to both choose to settle and 
not settle, depending on external factors and different costs. Using a Stag Hunt 
approach, this implies that if a settlement is less costly than other alternatives for 
the respondent, the state will choose to settle.  But if the respondent can make a 
greater gain from not settling, then the state will do so. Hence, the member states 
have no greater value of non-cooperation. If it is possible to coordinate so that 
both parties maximize their own utility, then cooperation can be achieved.  
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6 Results and Implications 
The aim of this study has been to investigate how well the Stag Hunt game can 
explain the decision-making in the WTO dispute settlement, if there are any 
differences in behaviour between income groups and if there is a difference in 
behaviour after the Great recession. In this part the different parts will be further 
investigated. 
6.1 The effect of being a lower-income economy 
The most significant part in the decision-making process are all the costs that are 
related to making a complaint in the DSB. If there wouldn’t be any costs related 
to making a complaint, there would be no reason not to make one. It is however 
difficult to make good analysis regarding the decision-making, since the value of 
r and c are the values that are most unknown values. The value of r and c also 
differs from case to case, which make them difficult to analyse.  
 In todays’ disputes the complainant has to expect that the outcome from 
the dispute will be higher or cover the costs for making the complaint. However, 
the costs are not small, in fact previous studies has shown that the cost per turn 
in the dispute amounts to a minimum of $500 000 (Moonhawk, 2008; Bown & 
Hoekman, 2005). This means that a member state must first consider if the cost 
of the dispute outweighs the possible trade gains in the event of winning the 
dispute.  
 The aim is for the DSB to include disputes with members from all 
income groups. However, a higher cost for disputes leads to fewer disputes by 
countries with lower GNI per capita, since high-income countries have higher 
amounts at stake in the disputes, they will be participating in more disputes than 
countries with lower income. 
 This claim can actually be confirmed, based on the statistical model in 
table 3 it can be seen that it is much more likely that HIE, MHI and LMI-
countries participate in disputes than low-income economies. Even though low-
income countries could afford the costs of participating in disputes, the risk of 
the dispute being prolonged and hence increasing in cost could be reason enough 
for not participating. If a low-income country would, against all odds, participate 
in a dispute, they would have to choose their battles with care and hence defend 
the case with all their means. 
 Table 5 shows that the highest rate of settled cases are when both the 
complainant and the respondent are defined as countries in the higher income 
groups. When the country is defined into a lower income group, the rate of 
settled cases is lower. The table also shows that there is a higher rate of non-
settlement if the country that complains is a low-income economy and the 
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respondent is from an economy with a higher income. This table can thus be 
seen as supporting the implication of the model. 
 The effects of the Great Recession in the DSB are not as significant as 
one might have wished. Some changes in the amount of cases could be seen 
under the recession. However it is difficult to see if this is an effect of the 
financial situation or just a long-term development. During the years there has 
been an increase of lower-income groups disputing in the DSB and all the 
dispute cases has started to even out between the income groups. It is therefore 
difficult to state if it’s the effect of lower-income groups having greater political 
say in the WTO after the recession or if it is due to the steadily increasing 
number of lower-income groups joining the WTO.   
6.2 Panel report 
It is first when the panel report is released that the agents know if the case can be 
considered as being “good” or “bad”. When the agents know how the case is 
viewed, the utility functions of the parts can be changed in order to adapt to the 
new information.   
 As can be seen from the statistical analysis in table 6, in most situations 
the panel will approve the filed dispute cases. When this happens, the respondent 
that had chosen not to settle, since they believed that there was a chance to win 
the case, will make a new utility function based on the report being approved. 
The risk of the Appellate Body not accepting the report (!!) can be included in 
the utility function.  
If the respondent choses to appeal then:  
 
(13)! (!!!!!!)= !! ! − 3! + (1− !!)(! − ! − 3!) =   ! − c− 3!  − !!c 
 
or if they comply (not complying, would not be rational):      
(14) ! (!!!!!!) = ! − ! − 2!      
Since !! is very small7, the respondent must have very strong belief in the case 
or the value of c must be very high, making the case worthy to challenge. When 
it comes to decision by the complainant in figure 6 after the Appellate Body, the 
utility function of the complainant can be seen as either: 
 
(15) ! (!!!!!!) = !! (! − 3!) + (1 − !! )(−3!) = !!! − 3!  
 
and if the compliant does not make an appeal: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7  See table 6 and 7. 
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(16) ! (!! !!!!!!) = −2! 
 
This implies that even though the value ( !!) is higher for the complainant8 there 
should be strong reasons why the state should appeal. What the model thus 
shows is that the most important decisions are made before the establishment of 
a panel.  
6.3 Possible outcome 
In the model there are some outcomes that have not been as discussed as others, 
such as the decision of making no settlement or no panel. In the model it is shown 
that these are irrational choices to make by the agents. However what can be seen 
from table 4, is that there is still a large amount of cases that ends up in these 
nodes. The game theoretic model therefore fails to explain this behavior of 
decision-making. It would be of great interest to further investigate why this 
behavior exists in the DSB even though this decision is seen as not rational when 
using game theory. It would also be of interest to examine if there are other game 
theoretic models that could possibly explain this behavior better, such as battle of 
sexes or other coordination games. 
6.4 Stag hunt implications 
The analytic result from applying the prisoners’ dilemma has been similar to the 
result that has been presented in this study. However there are some differences 
between the analyses that affect the outcome of the results. In the PD model, the 
outcome will always be that the agents defect from cooperation. However, what 
the Stag Hunt shows is that the agents will either choose to totally cooperate or 
completely defect. Hence there are two possible outcomes of the game, rather than 
one in the prisoner’s dilemma. Previous studies using the PD model have failed to 
explain that in practice, agents or states do not always choose one strict line of 
decision; rather, the states will optimize their decisions based on the expected 
outcome or utility of their decisions.  
 The stag hunt model sought to explain that in international relations, states 
are not aiming to create conflicts as their main mission. However in areas such as 
trade where the outcome from making large trade measures can generate huge 
economic benefits, the decisions will be based on maximizing the economic profit 
for the own state.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8  See also table 7. 
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7 Conclusion 
Using a game theoretic model, this study has aimed to investigate the decision-
making of member states in the WTO dispute settlement during 1995 to 2012. 
During this period the WTO has undergone rapid transformation and now9 
contains 160 member states. With more countries that have to come together in 
different trade areas, the work of the dispute settlement has not been on a 
downward trend. On the contrary, the increased accession rate has made the role 
of the dispute settlement even more important than before. It has therefore been of 
great interest to investigate the behavior of the member state in the DSB, by 
transforming the dispute cases into statistical data suitable for quantitative and 
game theoretical analysis. Based on the research questions, the result of the study 
shows that the game theoretical model of stag hunt can be used to explain 
extensive parts of the decision-making in the DSB. The study also shows that 
there is a difference between the cases depending on the GNI per capita of 
countries. However, the study cannot show any direct effects of the Great 
Recession on the amount and distribution of cases in the DSB.  
 When using this statistical approach it can be problematic to make too 
great assumptions on the strategic decision-making, since none of the disputes has 
been completely reviewed in detail. Hence, it would be of interest to further 
analyze a smaller amount of disputes more profoundly and test if other game 
theories can explain the disputes better. 
 Another issue with using this kind of approach is that through using a 
game theoretic model, the only costs accounted for in the model are the costs that 
can be connected to actual dispute costs. However, when it comes to trade there 
are other factors and costs not included that can have equally large effects as the 
actual dispute costs, such as the long term costs related to political and 
economical embargo that the disputing countries can put up against each other. A 
resolved dispute can also lead to new disputes between the countries as acts of 
revenge or because of hidden political agendas; these costs are not accounted for 
in the game. What should be seen from this study is that by using the game 
theoretical model of stag hunt on the dispute settlement, the study can give a good 
indication on how the different member states act in the DSB. When comparing 
with previous studies, the implementation of Stag Hunt shows that in the DSB 
there is not a constant conflict or constant concern for relative gains (non-
cooperation implication) between states, Rather, states tries to maximize their 
outcome and will chose to cooperate or defect depending on which decision 
contributes to the highest outcome. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9  October 15th, 2014 ( http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  ) 
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Appendix A  
Figure 5. Dispute Settlement System 
 
 
 Consultation 
Establishment of panel and panel report 
• By the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
Appellate Report 
Implementation/ Non-implementation 
Retaliation 
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Appendix B 
Table 1. Dispute Settlement Cases  
 
Year Number of Cases 
1995 25 
1996 39 
1997 50 
1998 41 
1999 30 
2000 34 
2001 23 
2002 37 
2003 26 
2004 19 
2005 12 
2006 20 
2007 13 
2008 19 
2009 14 
2010 17 
2011 8 
2012 27 
SUM 454 
Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
 
Table 2.  Dispute participation 1995 to 2012 
 
Countries Participated Complainant Respondent Both 
Low income economies     
Bangladesh 1 1   
Benin     
Burkina Faso     
Burundi     
Cambodia     
Central African Republic     
Chad     
Gambia, The     
Guinea     
Guinea-Bissau     
  35 
Haiti     
Kenya     
Kyrgyz Republic     
Madagascar     
Mali     
Malawi     
Mozambique     
Myanmar     
Nepal     
Niger     
Rwanda     
Sierra Leone     
Tajikistan     
Tanzania     
Togo     
Uganda     
Zimbabwe     
SUM 1 1 0 0 
Lower-middle income economies     
Armenia     
Bolivia     
Cameroon     
Cape Verde     
Congo, rep     
Cote d'Ivore     
Djibouti     
Egypt 1  4  
El Salvador 1 1   
Georgia     
Ghana     
Guatemala 1 8 2 1 
Guyana     
Honduras 1 8   
India 1 19 21 1 
Indonesia 1 6 4  
Lesotho     
Mauritania     
Moldova 1 1 1 1 
Mongolia     
Morocco     
Nicaragua 1 1 2 1 
Nigeria     
Pakistan 1 3 2 1 
Papua New Guinea     
Paraguay     
  36 
Philippines 1 5 6 1 
Samoa     
Senegal     
Solomon Islands     
Sri Lanka 1 1   
Swaziland     
Taipei, China 1 2   
Ukraine 1 3 1 1 
Vanuatu     
Viet Nam 1 2   
Zambia     
SUM 14 60 43 7 
Upper-middle income economies     
Albania     
Angola     
Argentina 1 18 22 1 
Belize     
Botswana     
Brazil 1 25 14 1 
China 1 11 30 1 
Colombia 1 6 3 1 
Costa Rica 1 5   
Cuba     
Dominica     
Dominican Republic 1 1 7 1 
Ecuador 1 3 3 1 
Fiji     
Gabon     
Grenada     
Jamaica     
Jordan     
Macedonia (FYROM)     
Malaysia 1 2 1 1 
Maldives     
Mauritius     
Mexico 1 23 13 1 
Montenegro     
Namibia     
Panama 1 6 1 1 
Peru 1 3 4 1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis     
Saint Lucia     
Saint Vincent the Grenadines     
South Africa 1  4  
Surinam     
  37 
Thailand 1 13 3 1 
Tonga     
Tunisia     
Turkey 1 2 8 1 
Venezuela , RB 1 1 1 1 
SUM 15 119 114 13 
High income economies     
Antigua and Barbuda 1 1   
Australia 1 7 11 1 
Austria     
Bahrain, Kingdom of     
Barbados     
Belgium 1  3  
Brunei Darussalam     
Bulgaria     
Canada 1 33 17 1 
Chile 1 10 13 1 
Croatia 1  1  
Cyprus     
Czech Republic 1 1 2 1 
Denmark 1  1  
Estonia     
European Union 1 87 73 1 
Faeroe Islands     
Finland     
France 1  2  
Germany     
Greece 1  2  
Hong Kong SAR, China 1 1   
Hungary 1 5 2 1 
Iceland     
Ireland 1  2  
Israel     
Italy     
Japan 1 16 15 1 
Korea, Republic of 1 16 14 1 
Kuwait     
Latvia     
Liechtenstein     
Lithuania     
Luxembourg     
Macao, China     
Malta     
Netherlands 1  1  
New Zealand 1 7   
  38 
Norway 1 4   
Oman     
Poland 1 3 1 1 
Portugal 1  1  
Qatar     
Romania 1  2  
Russian Federation     
Samoa     
Saudi Arabia     
Singapore 1 1   
Slovak Republic 1  3  
Slovenia     
Spain     
Sweden 1  1  
Switzerland 1 4   
Trinidad and Tobago 1  2  
United Arab Emirates     
United Kingdoms 1  1  
United States 1 104 119 1 
Uruguay 1 1 1 1 
SUM 29 301 290 11 
Total Sum 60 481 425 31 
 Source: WTO, Dispute Settlement, 1995 to 2012 
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Appendix C 
Table 12. Extended status of dispute cases 
 
In consultation 1
37 
Panel established, but not yet composed 1
8 
Panel composed 1
6 
Panel report under appeal 2 
Report(s) adopted, no further action required 2
7 
Report(s) adopted, with recommendation to bring measure(s) into 
conformity 
2
5 
Implementation notified by respondent 8
5 
Mutually acceptable solution on implementation notified 2
1 
Compliance proceeding ongoing 5 
Compliance proceedings completed without finding of non-compliance 2 
Compliance proceedings completed with finding(s) of non-compliance 5 
Authorization to retaliate requested (including 22.6 arbitration) 4 
Authorization to retaliate granted 5 
Authority for panel lapsed 1
1 
Settled or terminated (withdrawn, mutually agreed solution) 9
1 
Total 4
54 
Source: (WTO C, 2014) 
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Appendix D 
Figure 6.  Extensive game theory applied on the dispute settlement 
Source: Own illustration, originally from Lannerberth 2008 
 
C: is the complainant. 
R: is the respondent. 
P: is the Panel 
A: is the Appellate Body 
c: is the economic value that the complainant loses (cost) because of the different trade 
measures that the respondent has made.  
r: is the economic value (revenue) that the respondent gains from the trade measurement 
committed to the complainant.  
d: is the cost for being a part of the dispute process. This cost applies to both parts in the 
disputes.  
n: is equal to the discount on c that can be negotiated by both the agents. 
 
